The main goal of this paper is to examine how entry by generics can lead to price increases for brand name drugs. We take as a point of departure the observation made frequently by others that the demand side of the market for prescription drugs consists of two segments [10; 28; 27; 9]. One segment (consisting largely of hospitals, HMOs and Medicaid patients) is sensitive to differences between brand-name and generic prices, while the other (mainly comprised of individuals purchasing drugs in a retail outlet based on prescriptions from office-based physicians), is not sensitive to these price differences. ' We examine models based on this characterization of demand to determine the circumstances under which price increases in response to market entry by generics will occur. 2 A second facet of our analysis concerns the simultaneous response of brand-name advertising and brand-name price to generic entry. Since there is some evidence from two recent studies [10; 3] that advertising tends to fall with generic entry, we explore the conditions under which this can occur in tandem with a positive price response to entry.
The paper is organized into five sections. The next section presents a simple brand name pricing model based on market segmentation. In addition to describing the conditions under which generic entry increases brand-name price in this model, we also consider whether recent institutional trends in the health sector, which are changing the relative magnitudes of the two segments of market demand, will alter these condtions. The simple model is extended to incorporate advertising in the third section. The fourth section reviews recent empirical evidence of price increasing entry and advertising responses to entry. A final section offers conclusions and observations on future research and policy directions.
II. A Simple Market Segmentation Model

Background
We noted above that one could view the demand for brand-name prescription drugs as composed of two segments, one in which buyers are sensitive to prices of generic equivalents and one in which they are not.3 Recent developments in the health care sector have enlarged the cross-price sensitive segment of the market. Hospitals are increasingly being paid under reimbursement arrangements which create incentives to reduce the costs per admission [13; 18] . Foremost among these arrangements has been the introduction of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). The per case prospective payment approach to reimbursement, adopted under PPS, pays hospitals a fixed amount for each admission based in part on a patient's diagnosis. 4 Thus the marginal revenues stemming from any treatment activities subsequent to admission are zero. This creates strong 1 . Medicaid is a major purchaser of pharmaceutical products. A number of states will only reimburse sellers for the price of a generic product if one exists. Others deny reimbursement for costly drug products. The reimbursable products are listed in a state's Medicaidformulary.
2. Grabowski and Vernon [9] offer a specific example where a profit-maximizing firm would increase price in response to entry. Our purpose is to provide a more general characterization of the cases where this would be true. 3 . There have been a number of models in the literature that are concerned with entry which leads to price increases in oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive markets [17; 19; 20] . These models generate price increases in response via one of two general mechanisms. The first is to assume economies of scale [19] . A second approach is for entry to both shift demand curves and to make them less elastic [17; 20] . Our analysis takes the second general approach.
4. The PPS system bases its payments on the national historical average costs of care for patients falling into each of approximately 470 diagnostic clusters. In addition, hospitals may receive special adjustments to their payment rate based on whether they are teaching hospitals, serve disproportionate shares of indigent patients, etc.
incentives for hospitals to be price sensitive in their input purchasing activities. Pharmaceuticals represent an important set of treatment inputs.
The new financial incentives appear to have altered the behavior of hospitals over time.
Hospitals are increasingly adopting policies that are aimed at reducing pharmaceutical costs. Stolar [24] A recent survey of HMOs ascertained the extent of therapeutic substitution of generic for brand name pharmaceuticals [5] . Approximately 31% of the surveyed HMOs used therapeutic substitution. Thirty-six percent of the HMOs that did not make use of therapeutic substitution refrained because it would violate state law.
Medicaid programs account for roughly 50% of third party payments for pharmaceutical products. State Medicaid programs have adopted several strategies for encouraging use of generic substitutes by beneficiaries [12] . One approach is to set reimbursement levels to pharmacists for drugs at the price of the generic products in the chemical class, if they exist. Another approach, used by one third of the states, is to define a set of drugs for which Medicaid will reimburse sellers. Some very costly drugs are excluded from this Medicaid formulary and are therefore not eligible for reimbursement [7] .
Assumptions
Our analysis of brand name price responses to market entry begins by assuming that the brand name producer is a dominant firm that incorporates price responses of generics to its own pricing decisions while the generic producers are fringe firms that take the brand name price as given.
(Thus, our model is a Stackelberg game.) Data on market shares of brand name and generic products are consistent with this characterization [4; 10]. The profit maximizing brand name producer is assumed to face a product market that is divided into two segments: loyal customers (DL) whose demand is unaffected by the price of generic substitutes and a cross-price-sensitive segment (Ds) whose demand is influenced by both the brand name and generic prices [17] . Our one period model assumes that barriers to entry for generics are low, as is implied by [28] , and that the costs of changing both brand name and generic prices are low. This implies that future entry decisions will not be affected by the current brand name price. The brand name firm is assumed to be aware of this and hence sets price in each time period taking as exogenous the number of current and future generic producers, denoted by n.6 The generic market is characterized by a Nash equilibrium among the n identical firms who take brand name price (Pb) as given.7
The Model
The brand name producer's demand function is 
Note that the first term of (3), which summarizes the demand response to a change in Pb, must be negative for the first order condition to hold. The demand response consists of the direct effects on the two segments of the demand function plus an indirect effect which works through the price reaction function that is determined in the sub-market for generics. For given values of n, DL (Pb) + Ds [Pb, P (n, Pb)] can be viewed as the reduced-form demand curve for the brand-name firm. Equation (3) requires that this reduced-form demand curve be negatively sloped.9
6. Thus, we exclude the possibility of "limit price" behavior. Tirole [25] points out that limit pricing is unlikely under the assumptions we have outlined. He notes that incumbent (brand-name) price may be correlated with productive capacity commitment; however, capacity constraints are probably not an important consideration in producing pharmaceuticals (though they may become more important in the market for biologically-produced products). Moreover, the Milgrom-Roberts [16] explanation of limit pricing where incumbent price is an imperfect signal of incumbent cost is also of limited relevance in the pharmaceutical context where production costs are small relative to prices and relative to total firm expenditures on drug development, production, marketing and distribution.
7. In order to examine the sensitivity of our results to the assumption that the generic price is endogenous to the brand-name firm, we also examined a Bertrand model in which this firm takes generic price as exogenous. The analytical results closely parallel the findings reported here. 8. The relationship between P * and n can also be derived from more general models where n identical firms have non-zero conjectural variations with respect to each other's output. See for example Waterston [29].
9. If aPg l/Pb > 0, the reduced form demand curve will be less own-price elastic than the ordinary demand curve for the brand name drug.
The effect of entry by generics on name brand price can be assessed by total differentiation of equation (3) to obtain an expression for dPb /dn. Using this expression, we examine the conditions under which market entry will increase name brand price (dPb/dn > 0). (Algebraic detail is supplied in the appendix).
We can express dPb/dn as: (4) shows that dPb /dn can not be positive unless either 1) entry increases the demand for the brand name drug, 2) marginal costs are decreasing for the brand-name product or 3) entry makes the reduced-form demand curve steeper (less elastic). Of course, the first of these possibilities seems rather implausible since it would require that generic prices rise with entry or that brand-name demand falls when generic prices rise (implying that the products are gross complements in demand). The empirical evidence of the impact on demand suggests at least small reductions in brand name market shares following market entry [23] . Little systematic empirical work on the nature of returns to scale has been reported in the literature. There is, however, little reason to believe that the marginal production costs of a specific drug would be decreasing, nor has this claim appeared in industry studies [4] . This leaves the third possibility, that entry makes the reduced-form demand curve steeper, as the most plausible explanation for dPb/dn > 0.
Variations in Market Shares of Loyal and Cross-Price-Sensitive Consumers
We have already cited evidence pertaining to HMO's, hospital purchasing practices, and Medicaid which suggests that the relative market share of price-sensitive consumers has been increasing. We now consider the implications of this trend for brand-name prices and for the responses of these prices to generic entry. We begin by reformulating the brand-name demand function in equation (1) 
Note that the numerator of the first r.h.s. term in (5) is proportional to the difference in own-price response of the loyal and cross-price-sensitive reduced-form demand curves while the numerator of the second r.h.s. term is the difference in quantity demanded between the loyal and cross-pricesensitive portions of the market. If one assumes that the shift of a purchaser from the former to the latter portion (which causes an increase in a) does not affect the quantity demanded for that purchaser (given prevailing levels of Pb and Pg), the second r.h.s. term vanishes. The first r.h.s. term will be negative (positive) if the own-price response of the cross-price sensitive demand is greater (lesser) than that of the loyal purchasers. While this might seem plausible, it is not obviously so; in particular, one might expect the response of reduced-form demand to be smaller for the cross-price sensitive purchasers if dPg*/Pb is strongly positive. It is also interesting to consider the effect of changes in a on the response of Pb to entry. Grabowski and Vernon [9] noted that brand-name price declines in response to entry were more commonly observed for injectable products that are purchased primarily by cross-price-sensitive hospitals. They went on to speculate that in the market for the orally-administered pharmaceuticals which they studied, the effect of expanding the cross-price-sensitive portion of the market (i.e., an increase in a) would be to make dPb/dn more negative. To examine their conjecture explicitly, the relevant expression to evaluate is Table I ). These cases could also be consistent with the observed empirical evidence of simultaneous brand-name price increases and advertising decreases in response to entry.
IV. Empirical Evidence on Pricing, Advertising and Patent Expiration
There are three studies which directly estimate impacts of market entry on name brand prices. Two of the studies make use of data which reflect pricing behavior during the period subsequent to the Drug Act of 1984 [9; 3].
The earliest study which is relevant to the models developed above is that by Statman [23] . In that work the pricing behavior of 12 name brand drugs was examined before and after expiration of their patents. The analysis focused on prices and purchases by drug stores. The empirical estimates of price response and market share changes indicated little change in either. On average market share fell to 96% of its initial level. Only one of the 12 brand name prices fell significantly following patent expiration. This evidence does not support the proposition that prices will increase following patent expiration. The very small market share changes suggest very low generic-price elasticity of brand-name demand; thus, the entry-induced shift in the slope of the brand-name reduced form demand curve may not have been sufficient to create the types of responses outlined above. 10 Grabowski and Veron [9] studied the effect of generic entry on prices for 18 high sales volume pharmaceutical products that were first exposed to generic competition during the years 1983 through 1987. For each drug the authors examined prices prior to entry and prices 1 year subsequent to generic entry. Using a rather sparse regression model they estimated the impact of the number of generic suppliers in a market on the ratio of the generic price to the name brand price." The estimated coefficient for the effect of the number of generics on the ratio of generic to name brand price is negative and significant at conventional levels. This result is consistent with the descriptive statistics presented by Grabowski and Vernon [9] showing that name brand prices rose relative to generic prices subsequent to generic entry.
In an interesting and comprehensive study of generic entry effects on markets for brand- 10 . Earlier studies of drug pricing by Schwartzman [22] and Weston [31] found little evidence of brand-name price responses to entry outside the market for anti-infectives. Moreover, the estimates produced by those studies are somewhat difficult to interpret. Since only simple regression models were estimated, it is not possible to disentangle the impacts of increased competition in a therapeutic market from the aging of particular pharmaceutical products. Most other studies have focused on entry by new drugs into a therapeutic class. That situation is somewhat different from the one examined in the theoretical work above. Some results from those studies are informative for the analysis of patent loss and price competition. The study by Bond and Lean [2] found that physician prescribing practices were quite unresponsive to newly entering drugs that offer little or no therapeutic gain over the original product. This is not necessarily informative because in our model we view demand stemming from office based physician contacts as falling into the "loyal" market segment; the effect of entry on the price responsive segment of the market is the critical factor in explaining post-entry brand-name price increases.
11. The regression included two covariates along with the number of generics. They were: (1) the total dollar sales in a market in a given year and (2) a time dummy. name drugs, Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz [3] suggest that simple pre-entry versus post-entry brand-name price comparisons or regressions of price on numbers of generic entrants may understate negative entry effects on prices because other omitted factors have caused brand-name prices to rise over time. In particular, they observe that after 1982 the Producer Price Index (PPI) for pharmaceuticals rose sharply relative to indices of labor and material input costs. Lacking observable variables which can explain this deviation from historical patterns, they argue that empirical price regression models must be specified so as to minimize bias from the unobservable, time-varying factors which have produced this result. ' 
V. Concluding Remarks
The models we have developed above show that price increases in name brand pharmaceutical products stemming from market entry due to patent loss may be explained by optimizing behavior by the name brand producer. On the assumption that marginal drug production costs are approximately constant, analysis of our basic model indicates that a necessary condition for such price increases is that entry leads to a decline in the own-price elasticity of reduced-form brand-name demand. Analysis of a model incorporating advertising shows that with constant marginal costs, sufficient conditions for simultaneous brand-name price-increases and advertising decreases in response to entry are that (1) entry leads to a substantial decline in the own-price elasticity of reduced-form brandname demand; (2) increased advertising leads to a substantial decrease in the slope of the reduced-form brand-name demand curve; and (3) advertising has a negative effect on the (negative) reduced-form demand response to entry. 13 . The estimate for effect of the number of sellers on the advertising to sales ratio was negative with a t statistic of 1.62 which is significant at the 0.10 level using a two tailed test. The result for total promotional outlays by the leading firm was also negative but no standard error or t statistic was reported (see footnote #42 in Hurwitz and Caves [10] ).
14. Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz [3] view their finding of a negative dA/dn as supporting the view that "expanding the overall market for the chemical entity is a significant function of branded-drug advertising." Of course, the analysis in our appendix shows that the sign of dA/dn depends upon a number of different factors in addition to the effect of advertising on the level of demand. Our overall analysis, however, supports this intuition of Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz [3] about the nature of advertising.
We also note that advertising which is market-expanding is most likely to be consistent with conditions (2) and (3). More generally, our analysis shows that the observed patterns of entry effects on prices and advertising can be explained by the properties of the reduced-form brand-name demand function and the nature of brand-name advertising.
Our analysis also examined the implications, for brand-name prices and entry effects on these prices, of relative growth in the cross-price-sensitive share of the demand side of the pharmaceutical market. The principal conclusion was that this relative growth would tend to reduce prices and increase the downward pressure of entry on prices if (1) the process causing this relative growth did not increase the overall level of brand-name demand and (2) the reduced-form demand curve for cross-price-sensitive buyers was more own-price elastic than was the demand curve for other ("loyal") buyers. One outcome that is consistent with our model and supported by descriptive statistics is that brand-name price rises while the average price (including both brand-name and generic products) of a prescription falls. This would mean that the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 would be having its desired effect. Moreover, our results at least point to the possibility that name-brand price increases in response to entry will be attenuated as the cross-price-sensitive segment of the market continues to expand.
Future researchers may wish to explore the use of more sophisticated models to probe further the implications of patent loss and entry. One direction for extending this analysis is to incorporate intertemporal demand considerations such as durability of advertising effects [3] . Grabowski and Vernon [9] have also suggested extending the model to allow for brand-name price effects on entry; to do so, however, one would need to formulate convincing a priori arguments for limit pricing behavior.
Further empirical research on the structural relationships of our models would also be valuable. Based on our analysis, research on demand for brand-name drugs should focus on the effect of generic prices on own-price demand elasticity for name brands and the effect of advertising on own-price and cross-price elasticities. We are unaware of direct empirical estimates for these factors in the literature. Empirical estimates of the generic price function, Pg (Pb, A, n), are also needed. '5 Another worthwhile direction for future empirical research is to develop separate estimates of demand functions for "loyal" and cross-price-sensitive buyers. From a policy perspective, this research would have considerable interest. With the growing cost-consciousness of hospitals, Medicaid programs, HMOs, and other private insurance arrangements, it is important to know the implications of this trend for prices, for drug expenditures under public and private insurance programs, and for the power of generic entry to generate competitive pressures on brand-name prices.
Finally, as Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz [3] have noted, a more complete understanding of the implications of patent policy obviously requires further research on the entry process itself. In the only econometric analysis of recent data of which we are aware, Grabowski and Vernon [9] have estimated a generic entry model and reported that the brand-name price-cost margin at the time of the first generic entry is the most important determinant of the number of generic entrants. In view of concerns about limit pricing models expressed above, the reasons for this connection between mark-ups and entry are an obvious subject for further inquiry. 
